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Abstract 
This paper looks at the effects of tax-benefit systems and social stratification determinants on 
the probability of poverty among mothers after childbirth and divorce/separation. The 
analysis was carried out for twelve EU countries, which represent a variety of welfare 
regimes providing different degrees of defamilialisation. We applied the stress-testing 
methodology using microsimulation techniques as proposed by Atkinson (2009) and carried 
out a regression analysis of the simulated results. We show that the degree of income 
replacement provided by the welfare state is higher for childbirth than for divorce. Countries 
with low post-childbirth poverty include those with an explicit pro-natalist orientation and 
socio-democratic regimes. High post-childbirth poverty rates are found in pro-traditional and 
South European conservative countries, and especially in the liberal regimes. The same is 
true for the post-divorce poverty rates.  Moreover, our findings confirm that the mother’s 
occupational class has a statistically significant effect for predicting poverty in the case of 
both events, with a stronger social gradient in case of divorce. Cross-country variation in the 
social gradient for post-childbirth poverty was insignificant. For post-divorce poverty we find 
weaker social class effects in the highly defamilialised welfare systems (Scandinavian 
countries and France) and stronger social class effects in the UK and the post-socialist 
countries.  
Keywords: welfare state, life-course event, stratification, poverty, childbirth, parental 
separation, divorce, Europe 
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The probability of poverty for mothers after childbirth and divorce 
in Europe: the role of social stratification and tax-benefit policies 
 
 
 
Introduction  
The probability of poverty has been traditionally associated with the position of an individual in 
the social stratification system, e.g. parameters such as gender, ethnicity, education, and social 
class (Duncan 1968, Townsend 1979, Erikson and Goldthorpe 1993, Grusky 1994, Breen 2005, 
Grusky and Weeden 2008). At the same time poverty might be triggered by life course events, 
such as leaving a parental home, childbirth, job loss, and divorce (Rowntree 1902, Rig and 
Sefton 2006). Some authors argued that the power of social stratification determinants has 
decreased in the context of general life course uncertainty (Beck 1992, Kemshall 2002, Taylor-
Gooby 2004). Evidence suggests, however, that these two types of parameters are interlinked. 
First, life course risks appear to be unequally distributed across social groups (Härkönen and 
Dronkers 2006, McLanahan and Percheski 2008, Klesment, Puur et al. 2014). Second, although 
biographical events such as childbirth and divorce are widespread, their negative consequences 
are distributed unequally (Walker 1994, Layte and Whelan 2002, Dannefer 2003, Whelan and 
Maitre 2008, Vandecasteele 2011).  
The welfare state may play an important role in reducing the negative consequences when 
biographical risks materialize by means of horizontal redistribution, as well as in reducing social 
inequalities through vertical redistribution. Comparative welfare state research originating in the 
works of Esping-Andersen (1990) highlights substantial differences in the institutional design of 
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the tax-benefit systems across the EU. This results in different distributional outcomes for the 
population in general and for women with children in particular, i.e. female and child poverty 
rates (Lister 1994, Taylor-Gooby 1996, Esping-Andersen 1999, Bambra 2004).  
The aim of this study is to disentangle the effects of tax-benefit systems, social stratification 
determinants, and life course events on the probability of poverty among women with children in 
European countries. Reducing poverty among mothers is important not only for their own well-
being, but also for improving the life chances of their children. It is also important for increasing 
the economic autonomy of women, e.g. their  freedom not to continue a potentially repressive 
relationship because of economic dependency (Orloff 1993).  
The contributions of this study are two-fold. First, we analyze how different types of EU welfare 
regimes contribute to mothers’ capacity to avoid poverty after childbirth and divorce/separation1. 
These are two widespread life course events that bring about substantial income shocks due to a 
loss of one’s own or the partner’s income. In other words, we are looking at how various tax-
benefit systems support incomes of mothers with new-born children and single mothers. The 
analysis has been carried out in twelve countries representing different European welfare state 
regimes. We simulate the two life-course events and the related income shocks using the tax-
benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD and the EU-SILC data. The reference period for the 
analysis is 2015.  
The second contribution of the paper is to confirm whether there is a social gradient to poverty 
among mothers after childbirth and divorce/separation and whether it varies across different 
welfare systems. To assess the impact of mothers’ social class on the probability of poverty after 
childbirth and divorce, we carry out a regression analysis of the simulated results.  
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From a methodological point of view, by focusing on demographic events, this paper offers an 
extension to the stress-testing methodology by Atkinson (2009). The approach is aimed at 
measuring the performance of the welfare state in providing an effective safety net to individuals 
after various income shocks. It was previously applied to study the effects of a rise in 
unemployment (Figari, Salvatori et al. 2011, Fernandez Salgado, Figari et al. 2013, Navicke 
2015). The microsimulation approach to assessment of financial consequences of childbirth and 
divorce is superior to other previously employed methods for this type of analysis. First, it 
enables us to assess the functioning of the tax-benefit system taking into account all its elements 
rather than separate tax-benefit components targeted at particular risks. Second, it helps obtain 
estimates that are representative for the whole population and study the distribution of welfare 
provisions and outcomes at the micro-level. Finally, simulations of the income shocks across the 
whole potentially vulnerable population helps avoid the problem of small samples and self-
selection in survey data, where we observe mothers who have already experienced childbirth or 
divorce and have adjusted their behaviour to the new circumstances. Given the nature of our 
simulations, the results presented in this paper should be interpreted as first-order effects of the 
public policies before any behavioural adjustment occurs.      
In the next section, we review literature on social stratification and life-course risks as poverty 
determinants and the role different welfare regimes play in moderating these factors. We then 
discuss methodological choices made for assessing the probability of poverty in the case of two 
life course events and its stratification gradient. Finally, we present our findings and the main 
conclusions of the study.  
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Social stratification, life-course risks and the welfare state policies as poverty 
determinants  
Poverty is an experience bearing immediate and long-term negative consequences for individual 
life chances and society as a whole. The probability of experiencing poverty may vary 
considerably depending on micro-level factors (characteristics of individuals and their 
households) and on macro-level factors (economic situation, the welfare regime). The existing 
literature distinguishes between two broad groups of poverty determinants at the micro-level: 
social stratification factors and life course risks. The effects of social stratification on poverty 
comes through the role of such factors as gender, ethnicity, education, or social class. These are 
characteristics that are unlikely to change during the individual life time, and can be transmitted 
across generations (Duncan 1968, Townsend 1979, Grusky 1994). Education and occupational 
status, in particular, are treated as the strongest predictors of life-long earnings and life chances 
in social stratification studies (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1993, Breen 2005, Grusky and Weeden 
2008).  
Another influential strand of research starting from (Rowntree 1902), emphasises the dynamic 
and transient nature of poverty, looking at income fluctuations caused by certain life-course 
events that affect almost everyone or large groups of the population. These are demographic and 
labour market related events that might lead to a loss of income and make individuals vulnerable 
to poverty, including childbirth, leaving one’s parental home, divorce, death of a spouse, 
unemployment, or retirement (Rig and Sefton 2006).  
It comes as no surprise that stratification factors and life course risks are closely interlinked. 
Their relation is, however, subject to discussion. The proponents of the individualisation thesis 
argue that the role of social stratification determinants have decreased in the context of general 
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life course uncertainty. This is a result of the emergence and widespread incidence of new types 
of risks in the post-industrial era (including less stable employment careers and family life) 
cutting across traditional social structures (Beck 1992, Kemshall 2002, Taylor-Gooby 2004). 
Within this strand of literature, poverty is viewed as a relatively transient phenomenon, which 
becomes less dependent of traditional stratification determinants.  
An opposite argument is that class may become less visible, but its importance is not less, but 
arguably far more decisive. First, life course risks appear to be unequally distributed across 
social groups. For instance, the less educated individuals tend to be disproportionally affected by 
divorce and single motherhood (Härkönen and Dronkers 2006, McLanahan and Percheski 2008). 
They are more likely to have a higher number of children and start having children earlier in 
their life (Klesment, Puur et al. 2014)2. Second, although biographical events such as childbirth 
and divorce are very widespread their negative consequences are distributed unequally (Walker 
1994). In the case of more educated and wealthy individuals, the personal income losses due to 
life course events can be compensated by other types of financial resources available to them and 
may not necessarily trigger entry into poverty. The same events experienced by less educated 
people might lead to a cycle of cumulative disadvantage whereby the initial social inequalities 
are becoming stronger over the life course (Dannefer 2003). The findings of cross-country 
studies show that differences across educational and social classes in terms of their probability of 
income poverty did not seem to lose their relevance in the majority of European countries (Layte 
and Whelan 2002, Whelan and Maitre 2008, Vandecasteele 2011).    
Persistently high rates of female and child poverty observed in industrialized countries imply that 
women with children are affected to a greater extent than men by various poverty triggers (Brady 
and Kall 2008, OECD 2009). Women with children are less likely to be in the labour market, 
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tend to work fewer hours and earn lower wages than other women, or men. The wage 
differentials between mothers and non-mothers have often been referred to as the ‘family gap’ or 
‘wage penalty for motherhood’ (Waldfogel 1998). In intact families the wage penalty and child 
costs are buffered by income pooling within the household. However, when income pooling 
comes to an end (in case of divorce, for instance), women are more likely to suffer from adverse 
consequences, being the main caretakers for children (Uunk 2004, Andreß, Borgloh et al. 2006, 
Aassve, Betti et al. 2007, Amato 2010, Brady and Burroway 2012, Brewer and Nandi 2014). 
This effect, though, is likely to be driven by interactions between gender and low education or 
social class (McCall and Orloff 2005). Korpi, Ferrarini et al. (2013) argue that historically, 
gender inequalities have decreased hand-in-hand with class inequalities since the mid-nineteenth 
century. However, after the 1970s these two broad inequality trends have parted company. Class 
inequality, especially widening income differences, markedly increased; the decline of gender 
inequalities has accelerated. Hence, while gender differences become less prominent, inequalities 
between women from different social classes are potentially on the rise.  
The comparative welfare state literature emphasizes the importance of public policies in 
mitigating the negative consequences of biographical risks and social inequalities, e.g. in 
preventing the downward mobility after life course events that are common sources of significant 
changes in living standards (DiPrete 2002). The two types of risks studied in this paper are most 
likely to be affected by the degree of ‘defamilialisation’ provided by the welfare system (Lister 
1994). Defamilialisation refers to the extent to which the welfare regime lessens individuals' 
reliance on the family (Esping-Andersen 1999)3 or facilitates  the economic independence of 
women (Taylor-Gooby 1996) 4
. 
In both cases, a high degree of defamilialisation has been found 
in the social-democratic welfare cluster (Scandinavian countries), to a lower degree in the 
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conservative cluster (continental European countries) and the lowest degree in liberal regimes 
(e.g. the UK). A number of studies emphasised important divisions within the conservative 
cluster. (Gauthier 1996) pointed at the existence of pro-traditional (e.g. Germany) and pro-
natalist (e.g. France) welfare regimes. In terms of the level of defamilialisation, the latter are 
closer to the socio-democratic cluster and the former are closer to the liberal cluster. Moreover, a 
strong case has been made for adding a highly familialistic ‘South European’ welfare regime 
(Fererra 1996, Bonoli 1997, Arts and Gellissen 2002). More recently the addition of the post-
communist welfare cluster comprising the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, has gained a 
wide acceptance (Cerami 2006, Fenger 2007, Hacker 2009, Aidukaite 2009). Though these 
countries are typically considered as highly familialised, it might not pertain to childbirth, since 
the promotion of pro-natalist policies became a common trend in this region in the 2000s due to 
a decline in fertility.    
We have selected two countries to represent each of the above welfare clusters for our 
subsequent analysis in order to maximize the variability in terms of policy designs and outcomes 
observed in the EU. The socio-democratic welfare regime is represented by Denmark and 
Finland, the conservative regime with pro-traditional family policies – by Austria and Germany, 
the conservative regime with pro-natalist focus – by Belgium and France, the liberal welfare 
regime – by Ireland and the United Kingdom, the conservative Southern European regime – by 
Italy and Spain, and the post-socialist welfare regime – by the Czech Republic and Lithuania.  
Our subsequent analysis will attempt to assess the probability of income poverty among mothers 
with new-born children and single mothers in different welfare regimes. Based on the results of 
previous research discussed above we test the following hypotheses:  
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Hypothesis 1: The welfare regime (as a combination of the original income distribution, tax-
benefit policies and family structures) is important in determining the chances of women to fall 
into poverty after childbirth and divorce/separation. 
Hypothesis 2: The outcomes of childbirth and divorce/separation in terms of poverty differ 
depending on a woman’s social class. 
 Hypothesis 3: The importance of social class in determining the poverty status of a mother after 
childbirth and divorce/separation differs across the welfare regimes.   
 
Methodology: assessing the effects of tax-benefit policies and social stratification on 
probability of poverty 
To assess the role of the welfare state in reducing the probability of poverty after childbirth and 
divorce we use the stress-testing approach originally developed in the field of finance (e.g. Jones, 
Hilbers et al. (2004)) and proposed by Atkinson (2009) for measuring the performance of the 
welfare state in mitigating the effects of various income shocks on individuals. The approach 
relies on tax-benefit microsimulation modelling which allows us to compare the distributional 
effects of the tax-benefit system while changing the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
population.  
The analysis in this paper uses EUROMOD – the tax-benefit microsimulation model for the 
European Union (EU) (Sutherland and Figari 2013)5. EUROMOD uses cross-sectional EU-SILC 
data and simulates, in a fully comparable manner, the effects of taxes and social transfers on 
household incomes for each EU country. It has been previously employed to stress-test the 
welfare state response to a rise in unemployment in several EU countries (Figari, Salvatori et al. 
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2011, Fernandez Salgado, Figari et al. 2013) and to measure the hypothetical welfare state 
response in case of unemployment and childbirth in a single country (Navicke, 2015). In this 
paper we extend the use of the stress-testing approach to the assessment of the welfare state 
response to hypothetical income shocks after childbirth and divorce in twelve EU countries. Our 
analysis is based on policy rules effective in 2015 and the EU-SILC data for 2012. In order to 
account for time inconsistencies between the input datasets and the policy year, updating factors 
are used6. 
Our approach to studying the financial consequences of these events is superior to the 
conventional macro-level approach based on comparison of some aggregate indicators as proxies 
for the degree of defamilialisation, as they tell little about the distribution of social provisions 
and outcomes for women with children. The micro-level analysis based on the raw survey data is 
also limited, due to typically small samples of mothers with newborn children or undergoing 
divorce. In addition, in the survey data we can only observe women who have already given birth 
to a child or have divorced/separated from their partners. However, the propensities of both 
events and their outcomes may depend on individual characteristics of women and their partners 
(e.g. their economic resources) and the degree of social protection provided by the welfare state.  
A model family approach that is frequently applied in comparative research on family policies 
(Skinner, Bradshaw et al. 2007, OECD 2016, Skinner, Meyer et al. 2017) gives a general idea 
about the impact of the analyzed programmes, but the results cannot be generalized to the whole 
population, so the overall welfare effect of a policy cannot be estimated. There was only one 
study known to us that applied a microsimulation approach to perform a cross-country analysis 
of the maternity and parental leave payments using EU-SILC data (Bártová and Emery 2016), 
but it was limited to the effectiveness of tax-benefit instruments specifically related to childbirth.   
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The application of the tax-benefit microsimulation model allows us to assess functioning of the 
tax-benefit system taking into account all its elements rather than individual tax-benefit 
components targeted at particular risks. Incomes of other household members are also taken into 
account, in line with a standard assumption on intra-household income sharing. As EUROMOD 
is a static microsimulation tool7, the results presented in this paper should be interpreted as the 
first order effects of childbirth or divorce/separation on mothers’ incomes given that the welfare 
system functions as intended and before any behavioural adjustment took place. In case of the 
life course events considered in this study, behavioral effects can be significant. For instance, in 
order to overcome income losses after the divorce women may move in with their parents, re-
partner, increase hours of work, etc. These are beyond the scope of this study which focuses on 
comparing the welfare state effort in terms of mitigating the life course risks. Accounting for 
long-term changes in behavior using a microsimulation model is difficult because many other 
factors, apart from the design of policies, might be responsible for these (e.g. changes in social 
norms regarding the family life). Thus traditional research instruments such as the analysis of 
panel data are better equipped for studying the long-term effects of life course events.  
The consequences of the two events – childbirth and divorce – are modelled separately. First, we 
model transitions for all potentially vulnerable individuals, i.e. in case of childbirth these are all 
women of reproductive age (18 – 45 years old) living with or without a partner8; in case of 
separation/divorce these are women living with partners and underage children (below 18 years 
old)9 . In the latter case we have excluded childless women from the analysis because the 
observed high rates of post-divorce female poverty are associated mainly with single parenthood. 
Simulating transitions for all the potentially vulnerable women helps us avoid the problem of 
small sample sizes and self-selection. We then re-weight all simulated transitions based on 
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predicted probabilities of, respectively, childbirth or divorce.10 The probabilities are estimated 
based on the original EU-SILC data11 . The re-weighting procedure includes calibrating the 
original sample weights wi  by predicted probabilities pi to obtain weights that incorporate 
predicted selection probabilities: ~ =  ∗   (1). Weighted estimates are further used for the 
analysis. 
To assess the performance of the welfare system in case of the two life-course events, we have 
simulated additional policies in EUROMOD that are directly targeted at tackling the risk of 
childbirth and divorce. The scope of simulation in case of childbirth includes monetary amounts 
of contributory and non-contributory maternity, paternity and parental leave payments and 
childbirth grants (see Table 1 for the main characteristics of these transfers in the selected 
countries). In the case of divorce, we have simulated monetary amounts of private child support 
(i.e. financial obligation by non-resident parents to their children mandated by the court) and 
advance maintenance payments (a minimum allowance provided by the state when non-resident 
parents do not meet their financial obligations) (see Table 2). Full descriptions of additional 
simulations are available from the authors upon request.  
Modelling of other tax-benefit programs that are available to women on top of the benefits 
targeted to childbirth and divorce, e.g. child benefits, child allowances and tax credits, social 
assistance, housing benefits, etc. are based on the standard EUROMOD simulations12. All the 
amounts are simulated in monthly terms. 
We have calculated a set of indicators to measure the effects of the welfare state in terms of 
stabilizing incomes (output indicators) and reducing income poverty (outcome indicators) 
(Hoddinott and Quisumbing 2003). Following Bartova and Emery (2016), our income 
stabilization indicators include replacement rate (the ratio of payments directly targeted at 
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childbirth and divorce compared to a mother’s own earnings lost due to childbirth or father’s 
earnings lost after the divorce) and compensation rate (the ratio of post-transition and pre-
transition equivalised13 household disposable income). Replacement rates are estimated only for 
women with non-zero earnings in the case of childbirth and for women with non-zero partners’ 
earnings in the case of divorce. Compensation rates are estimated for all women and therefore 
capture the effects both due to cross-country differences in the tax-benefit rules and due to 
differences in family composition and employment patterns. The poverty reduction effect 
(outcome indicator) is captured by the post-transition poverty status measured against a pre-
transition poverty line. Individuals are considered poor if their equivalised disposable income 
after the transition falls below a poverty line fixed at 60% of the median equivalised disposable 
income in the original population before the transition.   
In the second part of our analysis these indicators are used to assess the impact of mothers’ social 
class on the probability of poverty after divorce or childbirth. The dependent variable is the post-
transition poverty status of a mother. We ran a logistic regression with country fixed effects on a 
pooled dataset of twelve countries. The mother’s occupational status (ISCO-08) and education 
were used as a proxies for her social class, the two measures that are available in EU-SILC and 
widely used in cross-national social stratification studies (Connelly, Gayle et al. 2016). The 
original ISCO occupational scale was collapsed due to small sample sizes in some countries, 
following the ILO definition of skill levels (ILO 2012). The occupational status variable used in 
the regression analysis includes four categories (corresponding ISCO categories are shown in 
brackets): level 4 (1 – senior officials and managers; 2 – professionals); level 3 (3 – technicians 
and associate professionals); level 2 (4 – clerks; 5 – service and sales workers; 6 – skilled 
agricultural; 7 – craft and trades workers; 8 – plant and machine operators); level 1 (9 – 
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elementary occupations). A large number of women in some countries could not be classified in 
terms of occupation because they have never been employed and we opted for including that 
category in the occupational scale as “level 0”. The education variable was collapsed to include 
three categories: (1) lower secondary and below; (2) upper or post-secondary; and (3) tertiary.  
To control for pre-existing differences in household economic resources, we included a pre-
transition poverty status, house ownership status and the size of financial capital (in a 
logarithmic form). We also controlled for demographic characteristics that might be associated 
with poverty (mother’s age, mother’s age squared, number of children and – in the case of 
childbirth – whether the mother is single). The welfare state protection is controlled for by the 
individual replacement rate (in a logarithmic form)14. Country dummy variables control for the 
effect of unobserved factors that are shared within each country. We then compare the predicted 
probabilities of post-event poverty for mothers by occupational status and education in the 
twelve countries.     
 
Findings 
Income replacement, compensation and poverty 
We start the discussion of the results with the indicators of income stabilization (replacement and 
compensation rates) and poverty for mothers after childbirth and divorce across the twelve EU 
countries.  
Figure 1 shows variation in replacement rates between and within countries in case of childbirth 
and divorce at the median as well as their 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th percentiles. As a reminder, 
the replacement rate is the ratio of payments directly targeted to mitigate costs associated with 
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childbirth and divorce compared to a mother’s own earnings lost due to childbirth or father’s 
earnings lost after the divorce.  
First of all, replacement rates appear to be substantially higher in case of childbirth as compared 
to divorce. For childbirth, median replacement rates range from about a third of the lost earnings 
in Belgium and Ireland to over 100% in France. This reveals striking differences in the 
generosity of maternity related benefits across the EU. Quite differently, child maintenance and 
guaranteed child support payments in case of divorce are of a more limited scope, with 
replacement rates at the median varying from zero to around 15% in Austria. Hence, divorce-
related payments across countries appear to be less generous and more homogenous. The 
replacement rates are close to zero in countries with no guaranteed maintenance payments and 
weak private child support (Ireland, Spain and Italy).     
As far as the variation of the replacement rates within countries is concerned, it is again higher in 
case of childbirth. Countries with the highest variation of replacement rates at childbirth are 
France, Finland, Lithuania, Austria, the Czech Republic and the UK. Yet in none of these 
countries do the replacements rates fall below 50%, as they have flat-rate benefit elements at 
childbirth, in addition to benefits replacing the mother’s earnings. The lowest levels of 
replacement for the 25th percentile of recipients are estimated in Ireland, Germany and Italy. In 
case of divorce, low median replacement rates are accompanied by less within-country variation 
compared to childbirth. The most dispersed replacement rates are observed in France, Lithuania, 
the UK and Austria.  
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Figure 1. Percentile variation of replacement rates of mothers in case of childbirth or 
divorce by country 
Note: graphs are not harmonized on y-axes. 
 
High generosity of benefits as regards to their duration and/or amounts can be interpreted as 
support for higher level of ‘defamilialisation’, i.e. contributing towards women’s financial 
independence and reducing income volatility after the income shock. No clear clustering by 
welfare regimes can be observed for the replacement rates either in case of childbirth or in case 
of divorce. However, the estimates of the replacement rates only partially capture the functioning 
of the welfare systems. Other child-contingent elements of the system, i.e. child allowances, tax 
credits or social assistance benefits, may also serve as income stabilizers and should be taken 
into account. The latter elements are captured by the compensation rate, i.e. the ratio of post-
transition and pre-transition equivalised household disposable income. Figure 2 shows the 
variation in the compensation rates between and within countries.  
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Despite the striking differences in the replacement rate patterns, the compensation rates are more 
alike in cases of childbirth and divorce. Annual compensation rates at the median vary from 77% 
in Belgium to 99% in France for childbirth and from 78% in Denmark to 93% in Ireland in the 
case of divorce. The UK and Ireland have the highest within-the-country variation of 
compensation rates in case of childbirth, hence the lowest compensation rates for the bottom 
25% of the vulnerable population. Spain and Italy have the lowest compensation rates for the 
bottom 25% of the vulnerable population in case of divorce. Overall, the 10th and 25th 
percentiles of the compensation rates in case of divorce are substantially lower compared to 
childbirth.  
 
 
Figure 2. Percentile variation of compensation rates of mothers in case of childbirth or 
divorce by country 
 
High median compensation rates in case of childbirth and divorce in all the analyzed countries 
imply that public policies are making a considerable effort in terms of protecting women with 
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children from income losses after the analysed life course events. Again, no clear clustering by 
welfare regimes is observed for the two analysed life course events based on the variation of the 
compensation rates. The high compensation rates do not automatically translate into the low 
poverty rates (i.e. the share of people with incomes below a poverty line), as the latter are the 
result of a combined effect of tax-benefit policies, original distribution of earnings and the socio-
demographic composition of the population.  
Figure 3 shows that there are substantial differences in the poverty rates resulting from the two 
analysed events across the twelve countries. In this case we observe a more pronounced 
clustering of countries by welfare regimes. The highest post-childbirth poverty rate (over 20%) is 
observed in the countries with liberal welfare systems (the UK and Ireland), pro-traditional 
continental countries (Germany and Austria) and in South European countries (Italy and Spain). 
Countries with the lowest post-childbirth poverty rates in case of childbirth include welfare 
regimes with an explicit pro-natalist orientation (France, Belgium, Lithuania and Czech 
Republic) and socio-democratic regimes (Denmark and Finland), although Finland appears to be 
on the border between these two poverty clusters. The clustering of countries by post-divorce 
poverty rates appears to be quite similar, with the exception of the Czech Republic which moves 
to the high poverty cluster (with poverty rates over 35%), and Austria which falls into the low 
poverty cluster.  
Overall, these results support the first hypothesis that the welfare regime matters in determining 
the chances of women to become poor after childbirth and divorce/separation. Moreover, our 
results demonstrate that the probability of falling into poverty is substantially higher for mothers 
after the divorce (ranging 23 to 43%) than for mothers of newborns (8 to 24%). Our estimates 
show large increases in poverty rates after divorce in all countries with the exception of Belgium, 
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with especially high increases in the Czech Republic, the UK and Spain. As far as Belgium is 
concerned, little change in the number of the poor after the transition to divorce means that those 
women with children who were initially poor remain poor after the divorce, while those who 
were initially non-poor are being protected from falling into poverty by the generous 
compensation rates (see Figure 2).  
In contrast, in case of childbirth the increases in poverty rates are observed in fewer countries 
(the largest ones are in the UK, Ireland and Finland). Two countries manage to keep poverty 
rates relatively stable (Denmark and the Czech Republic) and in three countries poverty rates 
after the childbirth appear to be even lower than before the event (France, Austria, Lithuania).  
 
 
Figure 3. Poverty rates of mothers before and after childbirth and divorce by country 
Note: Poverty rate is the percentage of individuals with incomes below a poverty line. Poverty line is fixed at 60% 
of the median equivalized disposable income before the event. Countries are ordered by post-event poverty rates.  
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The effects of social stratification on poverty in different welfare regimes  
After having established that the welfare regime is important in mitigating poverty outcomes for 
women after childbirth and divorce (Hypothesis 1), we would like to test whether there is a 
social gradient to poverty after childbirth and divorce (Hypothesis 2) and whether it differs 
across countries with different types of welfare systems (Hypothesis 3). To do that we estimate 
logistic regressions for the effects of a mother’s social class on the probability of poverty after 
either childbirth or divorce (see Table 3 for descriptive statistics and Table 4 for the results).  
Figure 4 shows the predicted post-transition poverty rates from the models with a mother’s 
occupational status and the mother’s education, while the control variables are at their mean 
values15. These probabilities already take into account the selection effects, i.e. the variation in 
the probability of childbirth and divorce for women of different social backgrounds. Our 
estimates confirm Hypothesis 2: i.e. mother’s social class has a statistically significant effect on 
the probability of poverty in the case of either type of event. Both the probability of poverty and 
the social gradient appear to be larger in case of divorce. Those mothers who were never active 
on the labour market seem to be especially vulnerable. The ratio of the predicted poverty rates 
for mothers with the lowest (level 1) and the highest occupational status (level 4) is equal to 2.3 
times for divorce and 1.7 times for childbirth. The probability of poverty for mothers with the 
lowest qualifications is 2.1 times as high after childbirth and 2.7 times as high after divorce, as 
compared to mothers with top qualifications.  
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Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of poverty of mothers after childbirth and divorce, 
logistic regression on a pooled dataset with country fixed effects 
 
Predicted probabilities of mothers’ post-transition poverty by country are summarised in Figure 
5. The analysis confirms that the social gradient in case of childbirth and divorce is present and 
statistically significant in all types of welfare systems. As far as post-childbirth poverty is 
concerned, the gap in probabilities for women with the lowest and the highest occupational status 
amounts to approximately 1.75 times in all countries; the gap in terms of education is about 2.1 
times. The cross-country variation in social gradients is significantly higher for post-divorce 
poverty risk. In this case, the gap between women with the lowest and the highest occupational 
status ranges from 2.2 times in Finland to 2.5 times in the UK. The gap in probabilities for 
mothers with lowest and highest qualifications is even higher – 2.4 and 2.8 times. Apart from the 
UK, the top three countries with the highest occupational status gradient for poverty after divorce 
includes the Czech Republic and Lithuania, and the bottom three (with the lowest gradient) 
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includes Finland, France and Germany. If social class is measured by mothers’ qualifications the 
top three comprises the UK, the Czech Republic and Spain, while the bottom three includes 
Belgium, Finland and France.  
 
 
Figure 5. Ratio of predicted probabilities of poverty after childbirth and divorce for 
mothers with the highest and the lowest occupational status and qualifications, logistic 
regression on a pooled dataset with country fixed effects   
Note: Counties are ordered by the post-divorce poverty ratios.  
 
To sum up, we find empirical support for Hypothesis 2: i.e. mother’s social class has a 
statistically significant effect on the probability of poverty in the case of both childbirth and 
divorce / separation. Both the probability of poverty and the social gradient appear to be larger in 
case of the latter type of event. With regards to Hypothesis 3, we do not see any substantial 
cross-national variation in terms of the social gradient for post-childbirth poverty. The variation 
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appears to be more pronounced for post-divorce poverty, i.e. with stronger social class effects in 
highly familialised welfare systems as in liberal (the UK), post-socialist and South-European 
countries, and weaker effect in countries with highly defamilialised welfare systems (socio-
democratic and pro-natalist continental).  Thus we find support for Hypothesis 3 only in case of 
post-divorce female poverty.   
 
Discussion   
This paper attempted to disentangle the effects of tax-benefit systems, social stratification 
determinants and life course events on the probability of poverty among women with children. 
The study offers several contributions to the existing literature. First, it explicitly compares the 
level of social protection available to mothers after two types of widespread life-course events: 
childbirth and divorce/separation. Second, it covers a whole variety of contemporary European 
welfare regimes characterized by different degrees of defamilialisation. Third, it looks at the 
variations in poverty outcomes within the welfare regimes, i.e. those driven by the social class of 
mothers. From a methodological point of view this paper extends the stress-testing methodology 
proposed by Atkinson (2009) for measurement of the performance of the welfare system in 
mitigating consequences of income shocks related to demographic events. Below we comment 
on the main findings of the paper and the three hypotheses that were tested. 
First, our study confirms the conclusions of the welfare state and defamilialisation literature 
about the importance of the design of the welfare systems in mitigating poverty risks of women 
experiencing childbirth and divorce (Hypothesis 1). Countries with low post-childbirth poverty 
include those with an explicit pro-natalist orientation and socio-democratic regimes that are 
characterized as highly defamilalized. High post-childbirth poverty rates are found in pro-
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
23 
 
traditional and South European conservative countries, and especially in the liberal regimes 
which are considered highly familialised. Similarly, high post-divorce poverty rates are found in 
liberal and South European regimes, while socio-democratic regimes and regimes with a pro-
natalist orientation achieve the lowest post-divorce poverty.    
Moreover, we demonstrate that the degree of income replacement provided by the European 
welfare states varies substantially by the type of the life course event. Indeed, replacement rates 
(i.e. the ratio of payments directly targeted at childbirth or divorce compared to women’s own or 
her partner’s lost earnings) in case of childbirth appear to be substantially higher and more 
variable within and between countries, ranging from one third to 100% of a mother’s median 
earnings. Policies targeted at replacing the father’s earnings after separation/divorce are of a 
more limited scope, more homogenous, with median replacement rates varying from around zero 
in some countries where there are no guaranteed child maintenance programmes to a maximum 
of 15%. Nevertheless, once the functioning of all the elements of tax-benefit systems is taken 
into account, the median compensation rates (i.e. the ratio of post-transition and pre-transition 
equivalised household disposable income) appear to be more similar for the two types of events 
and across the welfare regimes, varying from around 75% to around 95%.  
Importantly, we have shown that the relationship between the generosity of the welfare system 
towards mothers after childbirth and divorce and female poverty is not linear. High 
compensation rates at the median do not necessarily translate into a low probability of poverty 
for all mothers. Within-country variation in compensation rates, in the original income 
distribution and in family characteristics results in heterogeneous income-stabilizing effects for 
different groups of vulnerable women with children. Higher within-country variation in 
compensation rates leads to higher poverty rates for mothers after divorce (ranging from 23 to 
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43% across the selected countries). Childbirth, with lower within-country variation in 
compensation rates, has differential effects on poverty across countries and results in lower 
overall post-event poverty rates (ranging from 8% to 24%).  
In accordance with the predictions borne out of social stratification studies we have confirmed 
the presence of a social gradient to mothers’ poverty in case of both childbirth and divorce 
(Hypothesis 2). Our regression analysis has shown larger negative effects of low social class for 
divorce and these are especially high for economically inactive mothers. The estimates 
accounted for the selection effects, i.e. the variation in the probability of childbirth and divorce 
for mothers of different social backgrounds.  
Finally, we find significant cross-national variation in the social gradient for post-divorce 
poverty, with weaker effects of a mother’s social class in the highly defamilialised welfare 
regimes (socio-democratic and pro-natalist) and stronger effects in highly familialised liberal 
(the UK), post-socialist and South European welfare systems. We have not found substantial 
variation in the social gradient across different types of welfare systems for post-childbirth 
poverty risk. Thus we find support for Hypothesis 3 only in case of post-divorce female poverty. 
The policies targeted at new mothers appear to be more equalizing than policies protecting 
women with children after divorce.      
Further research can address the limitations of the present analysis. First, as our current analysis 
relies on EUROMOD, which is a static microsimulation model, the results in this paper are first 
order effects of demographic events on the financial outcomes of women. We can expect the 
economic position of women to recover in the longer run, e.g. due to support from extended 
family, re-partnering, increasing work hours, etc. It would be interesting to study the role of 
social stratification determinants for the long-term economic recovery prospects across the 
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welfare regimes. Second, the analysis has focused on cash programmes, omitting non-cash 
policies which might play an important role. For instance, the availability of affordable and 
quality public childcare may increase women’s incentives to work after childbirth or separation 
and, thus, reduce the negative financial consequences of these events in a long run. Taking the 
non-cash welfare provisions into account can be expected to strengthen the positive effects of 
cash transfers in some welfare regimes (e.g. socio-democratic) and mitigate the lack of those in 
other welfare regimes (e.g. post-communist). Finally, it would be valuable to investigate how the 
relationship between welfare systems, mothers’ social class and poverty have changed over time. 
We can expect poverty among single mothers to become more transient and less dependent on 
traditional stratification determinants in socio-democratic regimes and regimes with pro-natalist 
orientation, but less so in highly familialised liberal, post-socialist and South European welfare 
systems.  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
26 
 
References 
 
Aassve, A., G. Betti, S. Mazzuco and L. Mencarini (2007). "Marital disruption and economic 
well-being: A comparative analysis." Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics 
in Society) 170(3): 781-799. 
Aidukaite, J. ( 2009). "Old welfare state theories and new welfare regimes in Eastern Europe: 
challenges and implications." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 42: 23-39. 
Amato, P. R. (2010). "Research on divorce: Continuing trends and new developments." Journal 
of Marriage and Family 72: 650-666. 
Andreß, H.-J., B. Borgloh, M. Bröckel, M. Giesselmann and D. Hummelsheim (2006). "The 
economic consequences of partnership dissolution - A comparative analysis of panel studies 
from Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Sweden." European Sociological Review 
22(5): 533-560. 
Arts, W. and J. Gellissen (2002). "Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or More?" Journal of 
European Social Policy 12(2): 137-158. 
Atkinson, A. B. (2009). Stress-Testing the Welfare State’ in Rettferd og Politik Festskrift til 
Hilde Bojer. B. Ofstad, O. Bjerkholt, K. Skrede and A. Hylland. Oslo, Emiliar Forlag. 
Bambra, C. (2004). "The worlds of welfare: illusory or gender blind?" Social Policy and Society 
3(3): 201-211. 
Bártová, A. and T. Emery (2016). "Measuring policy entitlements at the micro-level: maternity 
and parental leave in Europe." Community, Work & Family. 
Beck, U. (1992). Beyond status and class? . Risk society. Towards a new modernity. U. Beck. 
London, Sage. 
Bonoli, G. (1997). "Classifying Welfare State: a Two dimensional Approach." Journal of Social 
Policy 26(3): 351-372. 
Bourguignon, F. and A. Sparado (2006). "Microsimulation as a tool for evaluating redistribution 
policies." Journal of Economic Inequality 4(1): 77-106. 
Brady, D. and R. Burroway (2012). "Targeting, universalism, and single-mother poverty: A 
multilevel analysis across 18 affluent democracies." Demography 49(2): 719-746. 
Brady, D. and D. Kall (2008). "Nearly universal, but somewhat distinct: The feminization of 
poverty in affluent Western democracies, 1969-2000." Social Science Research 37: 976-1007. 
Breen, R. (2005). Foundations of neo-Weberian class analysis. Approaches to class analysis. E. 
O. Wright. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
27 
 
Brewer, M. and A. Nandi (2014). Partnership dissolution: how does it affect income, 
employment and well-being? ISER Working Paper No. 2014-30. Colchester, University of 
Essex. 
Cerami, A. (2006). Social policy in Central and Eastern Europe: the emergence of a new 
European welfare regime. Berlin, LIT Verlag. 
Connelly, R., V. Gayle and P. S. Lambert (2016). "A Review of occupation-based social 
classifications for social survey research." Methodological Innovations 9: 1–14. 
Dannefer, D. (2003). "Cumulative advantage/disadvantage and the life course: cross-fertilizing 
age and social science theory." Journal of Gerontology 58: 327-337. 
DiPrete, T. (2002). "Life course risks, mobility regimes and mobility consequences: a 
comparison of Sweden, Germany and the United States." American Journal of Sociology 108(2): 
267-309. 
Duncan, O. D. (1968). Social stratification and mobility: problems in the measurement of trend. 
Indicators of social change. E. B. Sheldon and W. E. Moore. New York, Russel Sage 
Foundation. 
Erikson, R. and J. H. Goldthorpe (1993). The constant flux: A study of class mobility in 
industrial societies. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge, Polity Press. 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1999). Social foundations of post-industrial economies. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Fenger, M. H. J. (2007). "Welfare regimes in Central and Eastern Europe: incorporating post-
communist countries in a welfare regime typology." Contemporary Issues and Ideas in Social 
Sciences 3(2): 1-30. 
Fererra, M. (1996). "The southern model of welfare in Europe " Journal of European Social 
Policy 6(1): 17-37. 
Fernandez Salgado, M., F. Figari, H. Sutherland and A. Tumino (2013). "Welfare compensation 
for unemployment in the Great Recession." Review of Income and Wealth 60(1): 177-204. 
Figari, F., A. Salvatori and H. Sutherland (2011). "Economic downturn and stress testing 
European welfare systems." Research in Labor Economics 32: 257-286. 
Gauthier, A. H. (1996). The state and the family: A comparative analysis of family policies in 
industrialized countries. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Grusky, D. and K. Weeden (2008). Are there social classes? An empirical test of the 
sociologist’s favorite concept. Social class: How does it work? A. Lareau and D. Conley. New 
York, Russell Sage Foundation. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
28 
 
Grusky, D. B. (1994). Social stratification: class, race and gender in sociological perspective. 
Oxford, Westview Press. 
Hacker, B. (2009). "Hybridization instead of clustering: Transformation processes of welfare 
policies in Central and Eastern Europe " Social Policy and Administration, 43(2): 152-169. 
Härkönen, J. and J. Dronkers (2006). "Stability and change in the educational gradient of 
divorce. A comparison of seventeen countries " European Sociological Review 22(5): 501-517. 
Hoddinott, J. and A. Quisumbing (2003). Methods for microeconometric risk and vulnerability 
assessments. Social Protection and Labor Policy and Technical Notes 29138. Washington DC, 
The World Bank. 
ILO (2012). International Standard Classification of Occupations: ISCO-08. Geneva, 
International Labour Office. 
Jones, M. T., P. Hilbers and G. Slack (2004). Stress testing financial systems: What to do when 
the Governor calls. IMF Working Paper WP/04/127. 
Kemshall, H. (2002). Risk, social policy and welfare. Open University Press. 
Klesment, M., A. Puur, L. Rahnu and L. Sakkeus (2014). "Varying association between 
education and second births in Europe: Comparative analysis based on the EU-SILC data." 
Demographic Research 31(27): 813-860. 
Korpi, W., T. Ferrarini and S. Englund (2013). "Women’s opportunities under different family 
policy constellations: Gender, class, and inequality tradeoffs in Western countries re-examined." 
Social Politics 20(1): 1-40. 
Layte, R. and C. T. Whelan (2002). "Cumulative disadvantage or individualisation? A 
comparative analysis of poverty risk and incidence." European Societies 4: 209-233. 
Lister, R. (1994). She has other duties: Women citizenship and social security. Social Security 
and Social Change. S. Baldwin and J. Falkingham. Harlow, Pearson Education Limited. 
McCall, L. and A. Orloff (2005). "Introduction to special issue of social politics: ″gender, class, 
and capitalism″." Social Politics 12(2 ): 159-169. 
McLanahan, S. and C. Percheski (2008). "Family structure and the reproduction of inequalities." 
Annual Review of Sociology 34: 257-276. 
Navicke, J. (2015). "Between a risk society and a welfare state: social risk resilience and 
vulnerability to poverty in Lithuania." Socialinė politika 10: ??? 
OECD (2009). Doing better for children. Paris, OECD. 
OECD (2016). OECD Family Database & Family Support Calculator. Paris, OECD. 
Orloff, A. S. (1993). "Gender and the social rights of citizenship." American Sociological 
Review 49(6): 726-750. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
29 
 
Rig, J. and T. Sefton (2006). "Income dynamics and the life cycle." Journal of Social Policy 
35(3): 411-435. 
Rowntree, B. S. (1902). Poverty: A study of town life. London, Macmillan. 
Skinner, C., J. Bradshaw and J. Davidson (2007). Child support policy: an international 
perspective. Department for Work and Pensions Research Report 405. Leeds, Corporate 
Document Services. 
Skinner, C., D. R. Meyer, K. Cook and M. Fletcher (2017). "Child maintenance and social 
security Interactions: the poverty reduction effects in model lone parent families across four 
countries." Journal of Social Policy 46(3): 495-516. 
Sutherland, H. and F. Figari (2013). "EUROMOD: the European Union tax-benefit 
microsimulation model." International Journal of Microsimulation 6(1): 4-26. 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (1996). The response of government: fragile convergence. European Welfare 
Policy. V. George and P. Taylor-Gooby. London, Macmillan. 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (2004). "New social risks in postindustrial society: Some evidence on 
responses to active labour market policies from Eurobarometer." International Social Security 
Review 57(3): 45-64. 
Townsend, P. (1979). Poverty in the United Kingdom : a survey of household resources and 
standards of living. Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
Uunk, W. (2004). "The economic consequences of divorce for women in the European Union: 
The impact of welfare state arrangements." European Journal of Population / Revue Européenne 
de Démographie 20(3): 251-285. 
Vandecasteele, L. (2011). "Life course risks or cumulative disadvantage? The structuring effect 
of social stratification determinants and life course events on poverty transitions in Europe." 
European Sociological Review 27(2): 246-263. 
Waldfogel, J. (1998). "Understanding the “family gap” in pay in women with children." Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 12(1): 137-156. 
Walker, R. (1994). Poverty dynamics: issues and examples. Aldershot, Avebury. 
Whelan, C. T. and B. Maitre (2008). "‘‘New’’ and ‘‘Old’’ Social risks: life cycle and social class 
perspectives on social exclusion in Ireland." The Economic and Social Review 39: 131-156. 
 
  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
30 
 
Table 1: Main characteristics of social transfers related to childbirth in the selected countries, 
2015 
 
  Maternity benefit Birth grant Paid parental leave Paternity benefit 
DK 4+14 weeks at 100% with 
ceilings  No 
32 months up to 9th 
birthday at 100% with 
ceilings 
2 weeks 100% with 
ceiling 
FI 105 weekdays 70-90% No 6 months at 72%-32% 54 days at 72%-32% 
AT 
8+8(12) weeks, 100% 
replacement or €8.80 per 
day (if not qualify).  
No 
Flat-rate and income 
related models. Optional 
amounts and duration 
(max 36 months) 
none 
DE 6+8 weeks flat rate, low 
max daily rate (13 EUR) No 
14 months. 65% to 
100% with ceilings none 
BE 6(8)+9 weeks, 82%-75% 
with ceilings 
Universal lump sum 
benefit 
4 months flat-rate 
monthly benefit 
10 days, 100%-
82% with ceilings 
FR 16-46 weeks at 100% with 
ceilings 
Means-tested flat rate 
benefit 
6 months (12 for lone 
parents), variable 
amounts 
11 (18) days at 
100% with ceilings 
IT 
Non-contributory lump-
sum benefit; contributory 
income-related benefit 
Universal lump sum 
benefit 
10-11 months 30%, 
100% for 30 days for 
public sector; income 
testes flat-rate benefits 
none 
ES 
Non-contributory (42 days 
flat rate) and contributory 
benefits (16 weeks 100%) 
Regional means-tested 
multiple birth grants No 
13 days at 100% 
with ceilings 
IE 26 weeks, flat rate No No none 
UK 
6+33 weeks flat rate or 
income related with 
ceilings 
Means-tested lump 
sum 
No 
2 weeks income 
related with 
ceilings 
CZ 
Compensation for  working 
less; 8+20 weeks, variable 
amounts with ceilings 
Means-tested lump 
sum benefit 
Flat-rate, optional draw-
down rates and 
durations (24, 36 or 48 
months) 
none 
LT 
10+8 weeks 100% with 
ceilings; non-contributory 
flat-rate benefit 
Universal lump-sum 
benefit 
Optional duration (1 or 
2 years) and amount 
(100% or 70%/40%) 
with ceilings  
1 month 100% with 
ceiling 
Sources: MISSOC Comparative Tables Database (2015 July: 
http://www.missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MISSOCDATABASE/comparativeT
ableSearch.jsp) accessed 12/05/2016, EUROMOD country reports (https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/country-
reports) and information provided by EUROMOD national teams; Eurostat (tables by functions, aggregated benefits and 
grouped schemes - in % of the GDP [spr_exp_gdp]) accessed 13/05/2016). 
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Table 2: Main characteristics of social transfers related to divorce in the selected countries, 2015 
  
  
Responsibility for 
determining 
maintenance 
payments 
Rules for 
determining 
amount of 
payments 
Different 
arrangements for 
children of 
unmarried 
parents 
Age at which 
support ends 
Advance 
maintenance 
payments 
DK 
Parents or State 
County's Agency 
if parents 
disagree 
Rules/ rigid 
formula No 18 years Yes 
FI 
Parents or Social 
Welfare Board 
and court if 
parents disagree 
(but residual role) 
Mostly discretion, 
informal 
guidelines 
No 18 years Yes 
AT Parents with court 
approval 
Formal guidelines 
and rules/rigid 
formula 
No 18 years Yes 
DE Parents or court if parents disagree 
Mostly discretion, 
using 'support 
tables' 
Yes 18 years Yes 
BE Court Mostly discretion No 18 years Yes 
FR Court Mostly discretion No 18 years Yes 
IT Court Mostly discretion No 
until the child is 
financially 
independent 
No 
ES Court 
Mostly discretion, 
using 'support 
tables' 
No 18 years No 
IE Parents or court if parents disagree 
Legal guidelines 
but high level of 
court discretion 
No 
18 years or 23 
years if in full-
time education 
No 
UK 
Parents or Child 
Support Agency 
if parents 
disagree or PWC 
in social 
assistance 
benefits 
Rules/rigid 
formula No 
16 years or 19 
years if in full-
time education 
No 
CZ Court  
Mostly discretion 
based on 
guidelines given 
by law 
No 
until the child is 
economically 
independent 
No 
LT Court Mostly discretion No 18 years Yes 
Sources: Skinner, Bradshaw et al. (2007); OECD Family database (http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm) accessed 
17/02/2016 and information received from EUROMOD national teams  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for variables in regression analyses  
  Childbirth Divorce/separation 
  Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent variable         
post-transition poverty status 0.154 0.000 1.000 0.220 0.000 1.000 
          
Predictors         
pre-transition poverty status 0.177 0.000 1.000 0.353 0.000 1.000 
          
mother's occupational status          
never worked 0.212 0.000 1.000 0.201 0.000 1.000 
level 1 (lowest) 0.080 0.000 1.000 0.120 0.000 1.000 
level 2 0.372 0.000 1.000 0.406 0.000 1.000 
level 3 0.138 0.000 1.000 0.124 0.000 1.000 
level 4 (highest) 0.198 0.000 1.000 0.149 0.000 1.000 
          
mother's education         
level 1 (lowest)  0.220 0.000 1.000 0.324 0.000 1.000 
level 2 0.389 0.000 1.000 0.422 0.000 1.000 
level 3 (highest) 0.391 0.000 1.000 0.254 0.000 1.000 
          
ln of replacement rate 2.477 2.136 0.000 7.079 1.526 1.484 0.000 9.905 
          
number of dependent children 0.909 0.968 0.000 10.000 1.545 0.723 1.000 11.000 
          
mother's age 31.706 5.294 18.000 45.000 38.366 7.725 13.000 85.000 
          
mother's age squared 1033.318 340.443 324.000 2025.000 1531.596 599.775 169.000 7225.000 
          
single 0.098 0.000 1.000     
          
homeowner 0.475 0.000 1.000 0.370 0.000 1.000 
          
ln of financial capital 3.796 4.406 0.000 19.547 3.271 4.230 0.000 19.547 
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  Childbirth Divorce/separation 
  Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
country         
DK  0.015 0.000 1.000 0.009 0.000 1.000 
FI 0.015 0.000 1.000 0.008 0.000 1.000 
AT 0.022 0.000 1.000 0.026 0.000 1.000 
DE 0.156 0.000 1.000 0.164 0.000 1.000 
BE 0.035 0.000 1.000 0.030 0.000 1.000 
FR 0.193 0.000 1.000 0.161 0.000 1.000 
IT 0.138 0.000 1.000 0.132 0.000 1.000 
ES 0.132 0.000 1.000 0.114 0.000 1.000 
IE 0.017 0.000 1.000 0.021 0.000 1.000 
UK 0.244 0.000 1.000 0.290 0.000 1.000 
CZ 0.027 0.000 1.000 0.034 0.000 1.000 
LT 0.006 0.000 1.000 0.010 0.000 1.000 
          
N 43,155       27,777       
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Table 4: Logistic regression for the likelihood of falling into poverty for mothers after childbirth and divorce/separation, 
pooled dataset with country fixed effects 
  
  
  
Childbirth Divorce/separation 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
B SE B SE B SE B SE 
 
mother's occupational status, ref: never worked               
level 1 (lowest) -0.1501*** (0.0065)     -0.2552*** (0.0049)     
level 2 -0.6737*** (0.0051)     -0.6576*** (0.0042)     
level 3 -1.5002*** (0.0077)     -1.0345*** (0.0064)     
level 4 (highest) -1.2829*** (0.0070)     -0.8399*** (0.0060)     
            
mother's education, ref: level 1 (lowest)            
level 2   -0.2982*** (0.0040) -0.4790*** (0.0033) 
level 3 (highest)   -0.8214*** (0.0046) -0.8497*** (0.0043) 
            
pre-transition poverty status 3.8806*** (0.0037) 3.8403*** (0.0036) 2.0583*** (0.0030) 2.1963*** (0.0029) 
            
ln of replacement rate -0.3482*** (0.0010) -0.4112*** (0.0009) -0.0288*** (0.0010) -0.0272*** (0.0010) 
            
number of dependent children 0.0668*** (0.0018) 0.0723*** (0.0018) 0.2551*** (0.0019) 0.2671*** (0.0019) 
            
mother's age -0.2005*** (0.0028) -0.2183*** (0.0028) -0.0854*** (0.0013) -0.0911*** (0.0013) 
            
mother's age squared 0.0031*** (0.0000) 0.0033*** (0.0000) 0.0011*** (0.0000) 0.0012*** (0.0000) 
            
single 0.5247*** (0.0050) 0.5719*** (0.0050)     
            
homeowner -0.5887*** (0.0037) -0.6439*** (0.0036) -0.3195*** (0.0033) -0.3647*** (0.0033) 
            
ln of financial capital -0.0930*** (0.0005) -0.0976*** (0.0005) -0.1178*** (0.0004) -0.1130*** (0.0004) 
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Childbirth Divorce/separation 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Country dummies, ref: DK            
FI -1.5419*** (0.0233) -1.5627*** (0.0231) 0.1977*** (0.0220) 0.1765*** (0.0223) 
AT 0.0552** (0.0197) 0.3318*** (0.0195) 0.0498** (0.0174) 0.0468** (0.0175) 
DE -0.2279*** (0.0178) -0.2638*** (0.0176) 0.4833*** (0.0152) 0.3836*** (0.0154) 
BE -0.9801*** (0.0200) -0.7423*** (0.0198) 0.2643*** (0.0169) 0.4431*** (0.0170) 
FR 0.7489*** (0.0177) 0.8877*** (0.0175) 0.7797*** (0.0152) 0.7781*** (0.0153) 
IT -1.0829*** (0.0178) -0.6976*** (0.0175) -0.3099*** (0.0152) -0.1425*** (0.0153) 
ES -0.7803*** (0.0177) -0.6342*** (0.0175) -0.2528*** (0.0152) -0.3189*** (0.0154) 
IE -1.4979*** (0.0211) -1.4524*** (0.0211) 0.1128*** (0.0170) 0.1175*** (0.0172) 
UK -1.0476*** (0.0174) -0.8224*** (0.0172) -0.7114*** (0.0151) -0.6206*** (0.0151) 
CZ -0.8230*** (0.0202) -0.8244*** (0.0200) -0.5751*** (0.0168) -0.6279*** (0.0170) 
LT 0.0857** (0.0265) 0.0954*** (0.0262) 0.0929*** (0.0202) 0.1855*** (0.0204) 
            
Constant 2.1032*** (0.0474) 2.2614*** (0.0473) -0.1616*** (0.0289) -0.1988*** (0.0291) 
            
N 43,155   43,155   27,777   27,777   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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1
 We use the term “divorce” throughout the paper to refer to all types of union dissolution, including married and 
cohabiting couples.    
2
 Most recent studies suggest a U-shape relationship between female education and higher-order births, however the 
effect so far has been observed only in Northern and Western Europe (see Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015)  for a 
review). 
3
 Degree of defamilialisation was measured through four indicators: family service expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP; the value of child tax allowances and benefits; the volume of child day-care; and the volume of home care for 
older people. 
4
 This defamilialisation measure was operationalized by Bambra (2004) using the following four indicators: relative 
female labour participation rate; maternity leave compensation; compensated maternity leave duration; average 
female wage. 
5
 Static microsimulation models, such as EUROMOD, allow quantifying the consequences at the micro-level of 
changes in tax-benefit policies, given that the characteristics of the underlying population remain constant, and vice 
versa. In practical terms, they represent a computer code that calculates disposable income for each micro-unit 
(individual or household) in a representative sample of the population. The calculation is made up of components of 
income taken from the micro-data directly (e.g. earnings) combined with the components simulated by the model 
(tax liabilities and benefit entitlements). Microsimulation models allow for a detailed analysis of the revenue and 
distributional effects of an individual policy, or of the whole policy system, before and after a real or a hypothetical 
reform. In contrast to the traditional analysis of raw survey data, microsimulation models are up-to-date in respect of 
the latest changes in policies and take full account of interactions between all elements of the tax-benefit system.  
6
 The original EU-SILC samples used in EUROMOD contain the following number of individuals: AT – 12517, BE 
– 12554, CZ – 18471, DE – 25475, DK – 11825, ES –30063, FI – 22563, FR – 25469, IE – 10527, IT – 42654, LT – 
11674, UK – 42027.    
7
 Static microsimulation models are adequate in evaluating the first-round distributional effects of changes in taxes 
and benefits under certain conditions. Namely if the reform is causing ‘marginal’ changes in the budget constraint 
faced by agents and all agents are optimizing under their sole budget constraint (Bourguignon & Sparado 2006). In 
order to study the second-round effects, arithmetic tax-benefit models need to be linked into behavioral models. The 
latter allow individuals to change their behavior as a result of endogenous factors within the model. The new 
simulated populations can be further used for the assessment of policy effects in the medium or long run using the 
static tax-benefit model.  
8
 The sample sizes for transition to childbirth are as follows: AT – 2,220, BE – 2,104, CZ – 2,840, DE – 3,960, DK – 
1,752, ES –4,975, FI – 3,481, FR – 4,184, IE – 1,885, IT – 7,183, LT – 1,504, UK – 7,090 . 
9
 The sample sizes for transition to divorce are as follows: AT – 1,289, BE – 1,314, CZ –1,685 , DE – 2,354, DK – 
1,486, ES –3,252, FI – 2,791, FR – 2,917, IE – 1,243, IT – 4,331, LT – 840, UK – 4,290 .  
10
 If the is more than one potential transition in one household, the one with the highest probability is selected. This 
situation is possible in multi-unit or multi-generational houselolds and is relatively rare. 
11
 Logistic regressions were used to predict the likelihood of childbirth (i.e. being a mother with a child aged up to 1 
year) and divorce/separation (i.e. being a non-widowed single mother with a child aged up to 18 years). The same 
set of predictors was used in both cases: mother’s age, mother’s age squared, number of dependent children, 
disability status, highest educational level, whether currently in education, whether currently employed, ln earnings, 
ln equivalised disposable income, ln financial capital, house ownership, number of rooms, level of 
urbanisation/region. In the regression for childbirth there was one additional predictor “whether lives with a 
partner”.  
12
 For detailed descriptions see EUROMOD country reports:  https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/country-
reports  
13
 Here and throughout the paper household disposable income is equivalised using the modified OECD equivalence 
scale.  
14
 We did not include the compensation rate in the models because of a problem of reverse causation. The measure 
accounts not only for transfers targeted at childbirth and divorce, but also for all other types of social transfers the 
household is eligible to due to the loss of earnings (of a mother or her partner), e.g. social assistance, family benefits. 
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Since these transfers are very likely to be means-tested, the compensation rate is positively associated with the 
poverty status of a household. 
15
 We have also estimated a model where both occupational class and education are included as predictors. The 
ratios between the most disadvantaged and least disadvantaged groups have somewhat decreased, but not to the 
extent that would change the conclusions about the significance of a social gradient of poverty. These results are 
available from the authors on request.     
